An exclusive interview with the Interfax-Ukraine agency of the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Rob Bauer, in which he assesses the situation on the battlefield, speaks of the same problems facing both Ukraine and Russia, the solution of which will be depend on the further development of the situation.
https://en.interfax.com.ua/news/interview/1016975.html?s=03
How will you assess the situation on the battlefield right now and how it can develop in the future?
I think what you see now is that both sides are looking at similar problems. One is personnel. Both sides are looking for new soldiers. Then you need to train those soldiers, so that’s the second issue that both sides are working on. The Russians lost a lot of people who could train those soldiers because they were lost in the first two years of the war, a lot of senior officers. Ukraine has the help of 50 nations in the world. So training is partly done with the help of other nations. And then thirdly, both nations look at new capabilities and more ammunition. And also here Ukraine has the help of 50 nations when Russia has increased its defence production capacity to a war economy and has the help of questionable nations like Iran and North Korea, and indirect from China. So both sides are having similar issues and working on these issues.
And then if the time is right, and that’s an assessment, the Russians will try offensives and Ukraine will look at counteroffensives. Kursk is a good example where a counteroffensive was conducted and where Ukraine invaded. For the first time since 1941 a foreign power is on Russian soil. That is a strategic problem for Russia. And it also presents operational problems for Russia because of the logistic lines that go through Kursk.
In the Donbass region the Russians slowly with heavy losses move forward. It’s not huge gains but it is gains. And Ukraine continues to defend itself very bravely and to the most extent very effectively.
How this war will continue depends on the ability to solve the problems I mentioned earlier.
Coming back to Kursk, how surprised you were when you saw this?
So there are a number of successes as a result of the Kursk counteroffensive, and there are some things not happening most likely as planned, as intended Perhaps Ukraine expected more troops to be drawn away from the Donbass region into the Kursk region to solve the problem in Kursk. And that has not happened as much as probably everybody thought.
We have to look at Kursk with a layered point of view: on the strategic level, on the operational level, and on the tactical level. If you look at the strategic level, Ukraine creates a strategic dilemma for Russia. When Putin says he defends the motherland, he is not successful because Ukraine is now in Russia. That’s not good. So I think that is a smart move of Ukraine. Therefore it led to a discussion in Russia about what are we going to do about this. Are we going to refocus from the Donbas to Kursk or not? . The strategic dilemma I think is still there because the story is not good for Putin. But he allows it to be there for the time being without really changing his priorities.
Maybe he doesn’t care about his own people?
Well, I think that in general one can say that their assessment of the value of human lives is different from ours if you look at the numbers of casualties that Russia accepts. Which is historical I think – it is not only Putin, this is historically how Russia has looked at this…
So, coming back to a question on possible development, for now, I would say there is not a lot of movement. But it all depends on how you solve the three issues I described earlier. In Ukraine and in Russia. And that is why I will continue to push for the discussion on the defence production capacity on our part of the world which needs to be ramped up seriously not only to continue to support Ukraine, but also to increase our own capabilities.
Do you believe that Russia can attack NATO?
I am convinced they in theory can attack because they attacked Ukraine. But besides rhetoric, we don’t see any preparations or any intentions to really move towards NATO. 90% of their land forces are engaged in Ukraine. So their capacity to do this now against NATO with their land forces is unlikely. We would see that. Can they attack with other means? They might. But we don’t see any preparations in terms of that.
Recently in the news I read that Russia would be ready to attack NATO sooner than we expected, something like in 2026-2027. What is your opinion?
The Russian ambitions are larger than Ukraine. We know that. So in terms of the political intent, we have to assume that it’s not over when the war is over in Ukraine. That’s one. Second, if you look at their military capabilities, they will have to reconstitute beyond what they are now capable of.
If you look at their industrial capacity to produce tanks, missiles, artillery, and all the things you need, especially in the land domain, then they need a number of years to produce all this material. But that is based on the standards of capabilities they had on 24 February 2022. If you look at their intent to improve and to become better than they were at that time, then they need more time.
But if you look at the manpower, now there are more soldiers in the Russian army, despite all the losses than they had in 2022. So the number of soldiers has increased. But the quality has gone down. The quality of their material has gone down because they are using from huge stocks old material. Like they’re now using tanks and armoured vehicles from the 1960s. But it’s still tanks and still armoured vehicles. So they can still replace lost materiel, but the quality is going down.
So therefore, in order to go back to what they could do to start this war, then they have to produce a number of more modern tanks. Can they? They can, but the pace at the moment is just enough only to replace what they’re losing in Ukraine. So if you want to go back to this original level of quality and quantity, then they need more time. They can only start to reconstitute if the war is over, because now they need to produce to replace what is lost during this war. So the answer is not a simple number of years. It depends on a number of factors. If the war is over, they need to be willing to continue to spend a lot of money on defence and not on other things in their society. So it’s a choice for spending on defence and not on education, health care and the other things.
Ok. How about this: Ukraine won this war, but Russia is still exactly the same how it was, West, NATO partners increased production. Russia increased production. And Ukraine is in the middle. What will be, first of all, the best way to protect Ukraine? Second, how obvious that with years, let’s say, in long term, this Third World War is unavoidable?
Third World War is not unavoidable, because it is always the result of choices. And for example, nobody forces Russia to stay in Ukraine, not even China. The war can be over if Russia packs its things up and goes home, then the war is over. If Ukraine would stop the fight, then they’ve lost their country. And that’s the difference. So, all these things are still choices. It’s not unavoidable.
I think it is important that the path we are on with Ukraine as NATO is that we are growing closer and closer together through the decisions that have been made. And that means that we are working on interoperability when it comes to the armed forces. Ukraine now has a myriad of different weapons systems that has been provided by the nations that support them. But of course, in the longer term, you don’t want so many different systems of tanks and artillery pieces. So, part of the discussion that we will have with Ukraine in NSATU (NSATU is NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine) is about the future of the Ukrainian armed forces, a discussion on a form of standardization, which types of tanks, which types of armoured vehicles, of artillery, aircraft, all the things that armed forces need. If you standardize it will cost less, you will need less training. So, it is an important process. For now, the focus is on making sure that you are winning the war, that you can continue the fight to defend your nation. And therefore, the focus is now less on standardization, but it is extremely important.
And so, in terms of your question, what is the best way to protect Ukraine? I think the discussion is on, the process is on, and the discussion with the NATO-Ukraine Council when Ukraine and NATO sit at the same table and make decisions together is on. And the discussions in the NUC will lead to further interoperability, becoming closer together. And we need to ensure that Ukraine can win this war, by keeping you in the fight, by training your soldiers. We will help you with the training, we will help you with the capabilities, we will help you with the ammunition. That’s the role NSATU is now going to play.
And where are we now with NSATU?
We are now in the process of setting up that command. That requires infrastructure such as communication and information systems. And it requires command and control.
And how long it will take?
The nations need to send people to this headquarter. And the idea is now that by the end of this year, we will have that command, as they say, initially operational capable. That means it can start its work. We are ensuring that it is seamless transition, from SAG-U (Security Assistance Group – Ukraine) to NSATU so that all the support will continue uninterrupted.
How about the other center JATEC in Poland (JATEC – Analysis, Training, and Education Centre)?
So, if NSATU is one pillar of NATO’s support for Ukraine, the JATEC is the second pillar. And don’t forget about third one and it is the money pillar as we agreed at NATO summit in Washington to provide EURO 40 billion in funding next year.
And JATEC is important because it’s the first joint NATO-Ukraine institution, with civilians and military personnel, under Allied Command Transformation, that is now going to work on the lessons learned from Ukraine. It will help Ukraine during the fight, to make sure that the lessons that are learned find their way into the assistance, in the training, in the weapon systems and the ammunition. We also want to learn the lessons from the war in Ukraine for future warfare.
What did you already learn?
Yeah, so one of the things, for example, is not a new lesson, but it is about the importance of the psychological part of warfare: the will to fight. The fact that you understand what you are fighting for. The moral component, the mental component of warfare is extremely important. The great lesson that we see where Ukrainians, with lower numbers, but with this much stronger mental component, are able to be stronger than Russia who has larger numbers. The Russians don’t know what they’re fighting for, they don’t have a clue. So that is a very important component in warfare, besides weapons and ammunition.
The other thing is, of course, the huge amount of drones that are now being used in warfare, the use of artificial intelligence in combination with drones, because artificial intelligence basically helps to make relatively simple systems much more capable. For example, sensors become much more capable with AI, weapon systems, accuracy becomes much better with AI. So the combination of AI and drones is an important change in warfare. There’s a lot of leadership lessons to be learned. The importance of mission command, I think, is shown in this war again. I mean, the Russian forces are very hierarchical, and a lot of things have to go to Moscow before they can actually decide something on the battlefield. And Ukraine, since 2014, changed its ways by the training through the Canadians, the Americans and the Brits in the timeframe 2014-2022, when over those eight years, you introduced the non-commissioned officers, the NCOs, and mission command, which has made you, as an armed force, much more capable with limited numbers than the larger Russian forces that are so hierarchical. So that’s some examples of the lessons.
But it’s also that we see a fascinating combination of World War I tactics and procedures, the artillery barrages, the use of the trenches again, infantry, wave after wave, things we thought were from the distant past are back in the 21st century. And at the same time, we see hypersonic missiles, we see drones, we see artificial intelligence, we see cyber, space. So the combination of those two, the very old and the very new, is part of the reality. When I was Chief of Defence in the Netherlands people would often tell me that the military is always preparing themselves for the last war and not for the new war. The truth is that we have to be prepared for both. You have to prepare based on what happens in the past, because it’s still part of reality, and you have to prepare for the new things that are out there as well. It is very mixed, as I said, in terms of technologies and procedures, it’s very mixed, very old, very new. I think there was sort of an idea that in many nations, also in the alliance for a number of years, where people said the new world wars will be about intelligence, drones, artificial intelligence, quantum, all the new things, and not this infantry fight in the mud. But war is not only about bits and bots, which is, let’s say, the modern side of it, but also still about mud and blood.
Recently Putin announced the review of nuclear deterrence doctrine. And he said that the updated version of this document proposed to consider aggressions against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the assistance of a nuclear state or support of nuclear state, as a joint attack on Russia. Putin said that it includes missiles, drones, aircraft. How can you read this? What he’s preparing for? Because we know that Ukrainians are asking to lift restrictions on the use of long-range missiles
We’ve seen a lot of messaging from Russia over the last two and half years that not necessarily always has been followed up by action. Putin has drawn some red lines before and they were in the end not red lines. But it doesn’t mean that you don’t have to take this very seriously. Everything the Russians are saying we should always take seriously. If I listen to this and if I connect it to the fact that Russia has not achieved any of their strategic objectives in this war – they wanted to take over a Kyiv within five days, they wanted to topple the government and basically they wanted to use Ukraine with a puppet regime – none of these objectives have been achieved. So I think the Russians are in many ways very frustrated and they are concerned by the fact that they are not able to achieve those objectives.
And they see that Ukraine sometimes with and sometimes without the help of 50 nations that support them can attack Russia more and more often and very successfully. Just last week there was a successful attack on a huge weapon depot where missiles were stored and also the oil refineries. And now Ukraine is attacking deeper and deeper into Russia with weapons systems produced now in Ukraine. So I think it is a sign of frustration from the Russians if they come with this sort of language talking about nuclear.
The attacks of Ukraine into Russia are in accordance with international law: self-defence doesn’t stop at the borders. You can attack the nation that attacked you to weaken its ability to continue the fight against you. That is military logic and it is in accordance with the law of armed conflict. Now whether the nations that give weapons agree to that is another thing and it is also part of reality that nations that have those concerns can put restrictions on the use of the weapons systems. I do understand that Ukraine is trying to convince the leaders that put restrictions on those weapon systems to lift it. But it’s all part of the reality.
President Putin says basically that the nations that support a Ukraine are part of the war. We’re not part of the war. What we do is in in line with the UN charter: we assist the nation that is busy defending itself against an aggressor. Russia is the aggressor; they invaded Ukraine, a sovereign state with international recognized borders, and violated all the international rules. If I would follow the argumentation of the Russians that means that actually China, North Korea, and Iran are part of the war as well. So I think Putin’s reasoning is uncomfortable at least for China. The bottom line is: Russia is conducting an illegal war. We are supporting Ukraine in a legal way because Ukraine is defending itself against an illegal invasion.
How about protecting yourself – I’m talking about a letter of three defence ministers from Lithuania, Poland and Romania – they want better protection of airspace because of Russian drones and if I do recall correct this letter they also asking possibility to shoot down Russian drone in Ukrainian airspace and to create some so-called air belt. What will be your advice for SG?
The fact that three ministers wrote a letter doesn’t make it NATO policy. I think that is important to state because there’s no agreement in NATO to do this. I understand their concerns because the violations of their airspace is of great concern and we see this especially with Russian drones and we see it with sometimes even Russian cruise missiles.
Now first to make sure that we understand what is happening you need to look at the intent in order to say if this intentional or is it a mistake. So the incursions are absolutely a concern, but the vast majority of these incursions do not seem to be intentional. And that is important also in the discussions on what we need to do. Secondly, we are ramping up our air defence along the eastern flank. We’re doing this by air defence systems, by air policing which is fighter aircraft from the nations along the eastern flank and that’s part of this rotational system. This is a priority for the Alliance. But we need to strike a balance between what can be done on a national level and on a NATO level. National legislation and policy play a role as well, for instance. Depending on where we are in the spectrum between peace and war, the legal authorities change. In a war it’s NATO as a whole, in peacetime, it’s purely the nation. And right now, NATO is not at war.
It’s extremely important that we continue to support Ukraine because this is not only about your sovereignty and the ability to remain a free and sovereign nation but this is also about protection of the rules-based international order. The Russians broke those rules. If we allow that to lead to success from their side then that will have much more consequences than only for Ukraine which in it in itself is bad enough but the world is not in a better place if the Russians win this war.
